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EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED SEARCH ACTIVITY:
ESTIMATING INDIVIDUALS’ MARGINAL WILLINGNESS TO PAY
FOR ATTRIBUTES
Abstract luis paper introduces a method for estimating werkers’  marginal willingness to pay for
job attributes employing data on job search activity. lhe empirical relevante  of this method is
shown by using studies that examine search behaviour in the U.S. and the Netherlands. We
provide estimates of werkers’ willingness to pay for a wide range of job attributes including the
risk of becoming unemployed and promotion prospects. Further,  we discuss and apply a method
for estimating unemployed individuals’ willingness to pay for recall opportunities and the
residual entitlement period. JEL: J3, J6.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the eighteenth century, when Adam Smith wrote “The Wealth of Nations”, economists
have been interested in how the theory of compensating wage differentials might explain the
existente  of wage differences in the labour market. One of the attractions of this theory is that it
allows for the estimation of workers’ marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for job attributes such
as collective  bargaining and the risk of becoming unemployed. This may explain the impressive
number of empirical hedonic wage studies that have focused on the workers’ willingness to pay
for attributes. Although many  studies have shown that non-wage differences between jobs can be
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significant to workers, the genera1 conclusion is that non-wage differences between jobs are not
very  important to workers (see Brown, 1980).
The theory of compensating wage differentials assumes that workers have complete
information in a static  environment. This suggests that if job outcomes are a result  of a dynamic
process and workers having  to search for jobs, estimates for the willingness to pay for job
attributes may be biased. These considerations have therefore encouraged theoretical research
that looks at the willingness to pay for attributes. In particular, it has been demonstrated that the
estimates of the conventional marginal willingness to pay for a job attribute are likely to be
biased downwards if it is not acknowledged that a job is a search good and a result  of a match
between an employer and a worker (Hwang et al., 1993).
These considerations have also generated a number of studies aimed at estimating the
MWP for job attributes using data on job moving behaviour and comparing the MWP estimates
with conventional estimates (Herzog  and Schlottmann, ‘1990; Gronberg and Reed, 1994; Van
Ommeren  et al., 2000).’  These studies point to considerably higher  estimates than those based on
conventional hedonic wage methods. Herzog  and Schlottmann (1990) and Gronberg and Reed
(1994) reported higher  estimates for the willingness to pay to avoid job-induced risk. Van
Ommeren  et al. (2000) found higher  estimates for the willingness to pay to avoid commuting.
Similarly, Bartik  et al. (1992) compared the MWP for residential characteristics based on
residential moving behaviour and hedonic price methods and showed that the MN’P  cstimates  for
crime reduction and school quality are higher  than those based on conventional csnmates.  In
addition, McCue  and Reed (1996) examined self-reported data on the workers’ \villinsncss  to  pay
for job attributes, and concluded that “werkers’  valuations of nonpecuniary dimensions of work
’ In addition, these considerations have generated a number of studies to improve conventional estimates by
correcting for mobility bias (see, for example, Kim (1992)).
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are substantially larger than previous research bas indicated”.
Given the frequent use of hedonic-based models to assess the benefits  of environmental,
health and safety regulations in the labour and housing market, these results are relevant for
theoretical and applied research and policy makers. “Hedonic-based benefït estimates should be
used with caution, and other benefït estimation approaches should receive  greater emphasis.”
(Bartik  et al., 1992).
In this paper, we develop a method to estimate the MWP for job attributes that explicitly
acknowledges that jobs are search goods. Assuming initially an elementary stationary
environment in which workers search for jobs, we wil1  demonstrate that the workers’ MWR  for
job attributes can be derived tì-om  data onjob  search activity.  This method is conceptually related
to studies in which MWP estimates are derived trom data onjob  moving behaviour by application
of search theory (Gronberg and Reed, 1994; Van Ommeren  et al., 2000). Later on, we wil1  relax
the assumptions regarding the search environment. For example,  we allow workers to search in a
nonstationary environment and to vary non-wage job attributes without changing job. As a result,
the search method allows US to derive the MWR  for goods like commuting time.  Since
commuting time  varies with residential location, the MWP for commuting time  wil1  generally
depend on workers’ residential movement behaviour.
In the literature on the theory of compensating wage differentials there is a large interest
in MWP estimates of the risk of becoming unemployed (Rosen,  1986). As is wel1  known, search
theory is particularly wel1  suited to the analysis of the effect of risk on labour market behaviour
(Mortensen, 1986). We wil1  use data on search activity to provide  plausible estimates of the
willingness to pay for the risk of becoming unemployed.
The method developed here is used primarily to estimate the workers’ willingness to pay
for job attributes. However  we wil1  also discuss  the possibilities of applying the same method to
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the estimation of the unemployed individuals’ willingness to pay for unemployment attributes. In
the current paper, we wil1  provide  estimates of (the upper bounds of) unemployed individuals’
willingness to pay for the expectation of being recalled from layoff and for the residual
entitlement period of receiving unemployment benefit.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two we introduce an elementary search
model. We then derive the optimal search strategy in section three, and explain the method used
to derive the workers’ marginal willingness to pay for non-wage job attributes. In section four, we
generalise the search model to increase the empirical relevante  of the estimation method. Section
fïve  pays special attention to the unemployed individuals’ MWP for unemployment attributes. In
section six,  the estimation method for the MWP is discussed.  The empirical relevante  of the
method to estimate the individuals MWP for attributes is then demonstrated in section seven.
Section eight concludes the paper.
2. THE ELEMENTARY SEARCH MODEL
The point of departure in this paper is an employed individual. This individual derives utility
from job attributes X. v(X) is the quasi-concave instantaneous utility function associated with a
job having  attributes X. The once-only loss in utility due to moving job equals c. The person
searches in the labour market with effort s at a tost  of k(s). s 20.  Search costs k(s) are increasing
and convex in search effort s,  hence k’(s) > 0 and k”(s) > 0. Jobs arrive with arrival rate p(s). The
job arrival rate p is increasing and concave in s,  hence p’(s) > 0 and p”(s) < 0. We suppose that
the effects  of the search costs on the instantaneous utility function are additive, hence v(U) =
v(X) -k(s). Job attributes offers are drawn randomly from a given distribution. XO  denotes the
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attributes of the job offered to the job searcher. Pooling of offers is not allowed: job offers are
either refused  or accepted before other offers arrive.
The expected lifetime utility received fi-om  the current job is denoted as V(X). V includes
the possibility of offers in the future, which is discounted at rate  p. The individual has to decide
whether to accept a job offer, taking into account the expected offers in the future. The individual
is assurned to maximise  lifetime utility V. Discounted lifetime utility can then be written  as the
sum of the instantaneous utility and the expected benefit  of accepting a job offer. So, V can be
written  as:
PWV = v(x) -k(s) +p(Wm~[U”&c-  V(Kh 01 (1)
In this expression the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of the job attributes XO.
The interpretation of the above formula is wel1  known. Note that at rate p(s) a job offer wil1  be
received, and that offer wil1  be accepted if the value of the new job exceeds that of the current
position plus the moving costs. Hence, the optimal acceptance strategy is to accept a job offer if
V(Xo)  -c  -V(X) > 0. The offer should otherwise be rejected. In the case that job moving costs c
are zero, the optimal acceptance strategy can be simplified:  accept a job offer if v(Xo)  -v(X) > 0,
otherwise reject the offer.
3. THE MARGINAL WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR JOB ATTRIBUTES
In this section,  the choice of search effort  s is derived using the first-order  condition  for the
worker’s optimal search effort. The optimal choice of s is obtained by differentiating equation (1)
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with respect to s, and setting the resultant to zero:
-;+$Emax[V(X,)-c-Y(X),O]=O zj-s>o (2)
The interpretation of equation (2) is wel1  known (Mortensen, 1986). The marginal search costs
equals the marginal benefit  of an increase in the job arrival rate. The second-order condition is
that the left-hand side of equation (2) is decreasing in s. The concavity of p and the convexity of
k in their arguments ensure that this condition wil1  be satisfïed.
We wil1  use equation (2) to express the marginal change of a change in a job attribute Xi
on the workers’ search effort. Dividing both sides by @/ds, differentiating with respect to Xi and
using the envelope theorem (EN/&=0 if s > 0), gives:
as a ak ap
,,[-,i--]-Pr[v(X,)-c-v(X)>O]T= 0 fs>O
I I
(3)
where Pr[V(Xo)  -c  -V(X) > 0] denotes the probability of accepting a job offer and where i = l,...,
n+l. Suppose that the n+l’s  job attribute is the wage. The workers’ marginal willingness to pay
for the ith nonwage  job attribute (MWPi) is then defïned  as the ratio of the marginal lzjêtime
utility of the ith job attribute over the marginal Zzjhime  utility of the wage. Hence, by using
equation (3),  we obtain:
MW~ =d”/^  zys>o
ax, aw
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(4)
where  i= 1 ,...,n. Our fírst  result  is that the workers’ marginal willingness to pay for the ith non-
wage job attribute, MWPi, equals the ratio of the marginal effects of the ith non-wage attribute
and the wage on search effort, conditional on search. Clearly, if s = 0 then as/&  = 0 and ds/dXi  =
0, and &/dX&/6w does not equal MI’Wi  , i= l,...,n.
Our second  result  is also straightforward to obtain. Since V= V(v(X),s(X)),  and using the
envelope theorem, one can readily see that:
av,av dv,av- -=- -
ax, aw axi ai zys>o (5)
Thus, we have shown that the ratio of the marginal lzjètime utility of the job attributes equals the
ratio of the marginal instuntaneous  utility of the job attributes. As a consequente,  the MWPi  is
equal to the ratio of the marginal instantaneous utility of the ith job attribute over the marginal
instantuneous utility of the wage.*  And, therefore:
as,~2!L,?!L
ax, ti axi aw zTG- (6)
Consequently, the ratio of the marginal effects of the ith non-wage attributc on the wage
on the search effort equals the marginal instantaneous utility of the ith job atn-ibutc  over the
marginal instantaneous utility of the wage, conditional on search. In summary, givcn information
on &ldXilds13w, s > 0, one obtains (i) the MWPi  for job attribute Xi;  (ii) the ratio of the marginal
’ One may also  assume that the MWF’i  equals the ratio of the marginal instantaneous utility of the ith attribute over
the marginal instantaneous utility of the wage (see Gronberg and Reed, 1994).
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effects  of job attribute Xi over the wage on the instantaneous utility function. Note that if the
optimal search effort s = 0, then ds/ûw=&/dXi  = 0, i =l,...,  n, and MWPi  does not equal
&/  dXi/&/dw  .
4. THE SEARCH ENVIRONMENT REVISITED
The on-the-job search model introduced  in section  2 is the standard theoretical framework to
understand on-the-job search. For empirical applications however,  it may  be too simplistic. It is
therefore useful  to investigate whether the results derived above stil1 hold under weaker, and
therefore more realistic, conditions.
Nonstationarity. Empirical applications of on-the-job search and job moving behaviour
indicate  that workers are active  in a nonstationary environment. In particular, on-the-job search
activities decrease with the time  being in the current job (Kalm and Low, 1984; Parsons, 1991;
Van Ophem,  1991). We wil1  therefore introduce time  ‘t’  into the model, which denotes the job
duration. We suppose that the structural parameters of the search environment (v, p, c, k and 6)
are nonstationary and depend  on t, (see Van den Berg, 1990). This implies that lifetime utility is
nonstationary, so V= V(t), and, therefore, search effort is nonstationary, so s = s(t).
Unemployment.  It is natura1 to assume that the employed individuals take into account the
fact that they may  become unemployed in the future. We assume that unemployed individuals
wil1  receive  a benefit  b. Let 6 denote the involuntary separation rate of workers from jobs. 6 may
depend on job nonwage  attributes X, so 6 = 6(X). For example, collective  bargaining coi’erage
generally decreases the risk of becoming unemployed.
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The opportunity to vary non-wage job attributes without moving job. Job search models
are based on the assumption that job attributes are fïxed  to the job and cannot be varied without
moving job. More realistically, workers vary non-wage job attributes. For example, by moving
residence, the commuting costs change (see Van Ommeren  et al., 1997; 1998). We assume that
workers may vary non-wage attributes X into X1  at rate q without changing jobs. We assume that
the costs of changing X into Xr  are equal to d. The worker wil1  vary job attributes only if the
expected benefits  of changing non-wage attributes are larger than the costs.3  In the remainder of
this section,  we wil1  write  V as V(X, w) to make clear  that w cannot be varied, whereas non-wage
attributes X may  be varied.
Given the assumptions stated above, lifetime utility V(X,w) can be written  as:
pV(X,w) = N(X,  w)/ ùt + v(X ,w)  -k(s) + p(s)Emax[V(Xo,w)  -c  -V(X,w),O]
+ G(X)[V(b)  -V(X,w)] + qEmax[V(X,  ,w)  -d -V(X,w),O]
(7)
Equation (7) can be interpreted as follows (see, similarly, Van den Berg, 1990). The discounted
lifetime utility is equal to the sum of the appreciation of lifetime utility V at t, the instantaneous
utility, the expected bene&  of accepting a job offer, the expected loss of becoming unemployed -
which cannot be avoided - and the expected benefït  of changing job attributes.
The optimal choice of s can be obtained by differcntiating equation (7) with respect to s,
and setting the resultant equal to zero. Going through thc same mathematica1 steps as in the
previous sections - and making  use of the optimality condition  that d(dV/ùt)ds = d(dV/&)/2t = 0
- we fïnd  again that MWPi  = &/aXi/&/~,  if s > 0.
3 This extension of the elementary model is interesting when  changing nonwage  attributes is costly and subject to
change. Otherwise, these attributes would be instantly optimally chosen  and become permanent.
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We see now that lifetime utility cannot be written  as V(v(X,w),s(X,w)),  but as
V(v(X,w),s(X,w),X,w),  since lifetime utility depends directly on X and on w via 6(X) and
V(Xl,w).  As a consequente,  dV/aXi/dV/ûw  cannot be written  as ûv/aXJ&/aW.  This implies that
the ratio of the marginal effects of the ith nonwage  attibute and the wage on the search effort
does not equal the marginal instantaneous utility of the ith job attribute over the marginal
instantaneous utility of the wage. In summary, under the weaker  conditions stated above, one
may interpret &laXilas/3w  as MWPi,  however  identification of the ratio of the marginal effects
on the instantaneous utility function is not possible.
5. UNEMPLOYMENT
In previous sections, we have discussed  the relationship between on-the-job search effort and
werkers’  marginal willingness to pay for job attributes. Similarly, the unemployed individuals’
marginal willingness to pay for non-pecuniary attributes that explicitly depend on the current
state of unemployment can be derived by supposing that the n+l ‘s attribute is the unemployment
benefït  b. An example of such an unemployment non- pecuniary attribute is the expectation of
being recalled to the previous job from layoff. Another example is the residual entitlement
period.
6. ESTIMATION METHOD
We wil1  discuss  here a method for estimating workers’ MWP for job attributes given information
on search behaviour. Suppose that exact information on search effort is not available and it is
1 1
only known whether workers search (s = 1) or do not search (s =O).4  One may then specify search
activity s by means  of a latent-variable fiamework  by introducing the latent variable s* (desired
search effort): s* = P’Y  + u, E(u) = 0; l3 is a vector of unknown coefficients.  Y represents a vector
of explanatory variables and Y includes job attributes X; u is a random variable with expectation
0.5  s and s* are related as follows: s = 1, if s* > 0; s = 0 otherwise.
Let pi the parameter associated with job attribute Xi,  i= l,...,  n+l. It is then obvious that
6E(s*)/6Xi = pi,  i= l,...n+l. In addition, GE(s*ls*  >0)/6Xi, can then be written  as a$i where
a > 0, i= l,...n+l (Maddala, 1985). Suppose that the n+l’s  job attribute is the wage and let PW  be
the parameter associated with the wage. Hence, pi/pw  equals the ratio of the marginal effects  of
the ith nonwage  attribute and the wage on search effort, conditional that the worker is engaged in
search, and thus:
MWPi=  pi/pw, 1,  .+..,  h.
In consequente,  estimates of pi/pw  can be interpreted as the workers’ marginal willingness
to pay for the ith non-wage job attribute (MWPi).
The assumption that search effort depends linearly on the job attributes implies that the
workers’ MWP does not depend on any current wage or nonwage  job attribute (see equation (8)).
In most empirical applications of on-the-job search behaviour however,  it is assumed that the
wage determines search effort non-linearly. The most common specification  is that the logarithm
4 The same result  can  be obtained if one observes search effort in a different way. For example, one may observe the
number of search hours per week (leading to a tnmcated variable model) or the number of search contacts  per week
(leading to a Poisson model).
5 Strictly speaking, unobserved heterogene@ is not explicitly introduced  in the search model. However, this
weakness can  be easily removed by making the assumption that search costs  are drawn from a population
dis t r ibu t ion .
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of the wage determines search effort. Such a specitïcation  implies that the MWPi  equals w.pi/pw.
Hence, the MWPi is proportional to the current wage. The unemployed individuals’ MWP for
unemployment attributes can be estimated in a similar way.
7. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS
In this study, we make use of one study that has examined workers’ job search behaviour in the
U.S.: Parsons  (1991) and one in the Netherlands: Van Ophem (1991).6  Given the estimates of the
determinants of job search activity as reported in these studies, we derive workers’ MWP for job
attributes (section 7.1). Results published by Barron and Mellow (1979) for the U.S. and
Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993) for the Netherlands on the unemployed individuals’ search
behaviour are used to derive the unemployed individuals’ MWP for unemployment attributes
(section 7.2).
7.l.On-the-job  search
We provide  the estimates of the MWP for job attributes using the estimation method discussed  in
section 6.7  To facilitate comparison of the results, we provide  estimates of the MWP for a job
attribute divided by the wage (multiplied by 100) denoted as %MWP.  One advantage of this
6 Other on-the-job search studies include Rosenfeld (1977),  Black (1981),  Hartog et al. (1988),  Blau and Robins
(1990),  Burgess and Low (1992),  Banerjee and Bucci (1994),  Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) and Hartog and Van
Ophem (1994). These studies do not allow US to identify the effects  of wage and nonwage  attributes on workers’
search activi ty.
’ The variante  of the estimated MWPi  is derived using the delta method, so Var( pi&)  is calculated as
[Var(pi)+(pi/pw)2.Var(p,)-2.(pi/pw)Cov(pi/~~)]/~~2.  AS it is common practice  not to report the covariance matrix of
the coeffcients,  we suppose that Cov(l3i,pw) is  zero. Hence, the reported precision of the MWP estimates is
somewhat inaccurate. For the current application, this is not problematic. In the case that MWPi  equals zero,
variances of the MWPi  estimates are exact so one may test the hypothesis that MWPi  equals zero using a standard t-
test. In addition, when  MWPi  is positive, the bias in the variante  is small, even for a relatively high correlation
between pi  and p  w.  For example, if the correlation between pi and p  w  is 0.2, which is high in this type of application,
then the relative bias in the standard error is less than 10% (for a full proof,  see van Ommeren,  2002).
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measure is that it is the closest  to the empirical specifications employed by the studies discussed
here.
Par.sons (1991). Parsons  (1991) used the 1980-1981 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to
study the employed workers’ choice among employed search, unemployed search, and not
searching for a new job. Ordered probit  models are employed for men and women.  The wage
rates are specified  in logarithms. The results show that current wages, promotion prospects, job
tenure  (for men, not for women)  and full-time work are each negatively associated with search
intensity (see Table 1).
****************
hert  Table 1
****************
Parsons  (1991) found that workers searched more if they worked part-time. Thus the
average  part-time worker prefers to work more hours than available on their current job. Hence,
the marginal rate  of substitution of wage for leisure is less than the current wage rate.’ The results
also indicate  that the MWP for a full-time position is higher  for men (65% of the current wage)
than for women  (35% of the current wage). Such a fïnding  is consistent with the notion that men
generally prefer to work more hours than women.  The results clearly show that workers search
signifícantly less if they expect to be promoted. Promotion opportunities are highly valued by
workers. ‘Very  good promotion prospects’ are valued at 176% for men and 225% for ivornen.
‘Good promotion prospects’ are valued at 112% for men and 144% for women.  ‘Not so good
1 4
promotion prospects’ are valued at 84% for men and at 42% for women  (the latter  is not
significant at conventional levels of signifïcance). We fínd  that the MWP for promotion prospects
is not strongly gender  dependent.
We wil1  explain by application of search theory that these estimates of the MWP for
promotion prospects are plausible. To simplify matters, we suppose a simplifïed search model
that allows US to obtain an explicit  solution for the MWP for promotion prospects. Suppose a
worker eams wage w and expects to be promoted at rate h. Promoted workers receive a wage wp
forever (wp  > w). The worker discounts the future at rate  p. Job-to-job mobility is ignored.
Lifetime utility V can then be written  as (pw+XwP)lp(p+h) and the MWP for h equals (wp-
w)/(p+h)  (since dV/&v = l/(p+h)  and dV/ah  = ( wp-w)/( p+h)*).  So, the MWP for h is positive,
and decreasing and concave in h.
In Parson’s (1991) empirical specifïcation of job search behaviour, dummies for various
levels of promotion prospects are included. Each dummy indicates  a different leve1 of h. So, the
MWP for a dummy can be interpreted as the willingness to pay (WP) for a certain leve1 of h. The
willingness to pay for h is defined  as [V(h)-V(O)]laVl&v  and can be written  as h.(wP-w)/p.  Now
suppose that the determinant ‘very  good promotion prospects’ implies that h/p  is 5. This seems
quite  reasonable, for example, the yearly promotion rate i. might be 0.50 and the yearly discount
rate p is 0.10. Since Parsons’  (1991) empirical results  indicate  that the percent MWP for ‘very
good promotion prospects’ is about 200%,  promoted w.orkcrs  receive a wage increase of 40%.
Such an estimate seems plausible (see Murphy, 1985; van Garneren, 1999).
Yan  Ophem  (1992).  Van Ophem (1991) used thc 1985 OSA Labour Market Sun.ey to
study the importante  of nonwage  attributes on the search decision of Dutch employees. A
8 The marginal rate  of substitution of wage for leisure is equal to the wage rate  provided that search activity is (i)
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measure for the monetary incentive to search is the determinant log(predicted  wage rate) -
log(wage rate). The results show that on-the-job search activity increases with monetary
incentives, unemployment expectations, unpaid overtime and commuting time,  but decreases
with job tenure  and good promotion prospects. Different measures for the predicted wage are
used using a ‘structural form’ and ‘reduced form’ model. In the current paper, we report the MWP
for job attributes based on the ‘reduced form’ model (see Table 2).9  Van Ophem (1991) reports
that workers search more if they commute  more, work unpaid overtime and expect to become
unemployed within a year. Workers search less if they have good promotion prospects or have
longer  job tenure.  The MWP for commuting time  (minutes per day, one way) is -1.40% of the
hourly wage rate.  Interpretation of the MWP for commuting time  is facilitated by focusing on the
MWP for one hour commuting (30 minutes of commuting, one way). The results imply that the
average  Dutch worker who  works seven hours a day is willing to pay 294% of the hourly wage to
avoid a one hour loss of leisure time  due to commuting (standard error of 147). This nurnber is
somewhat higher  than those reported by the majority of studies, which generally fïnd  estimates of
less than 100 (see Small, 1992),  but in line with studies such as Zax (1991). The workers’ MWP
for the absente  of unpaid overtime (measured in hours per week) is 4.75% of the weekly wage. In
the Netherlands, the average  employed individual works about 35 hours per week. Workers’
MWP for the absente  of unpaid overtime is therefore, on average, 166% of the wage rate
(standard error is 60). Thus, the percent MWP for the absente  of one hour unpaid overtime is not
signifïcantly different from 100 (even at the 10% level) and we cannot refute the hypothesis that
the marginal rate of substitution of wage for leisure equals the wage rate.
affected  by the hourly wage rate  and (ii) not affected  by the number of work hours.
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****************
Insert Table 2
****************
Van Ophem (1991) includes a determinant of search activity defïned as ‘the expectation of
becoming unemployed within 12 months’. The MWP for the absente  of this expectation is about
147% of the wage rate. Consequently, Dutch workers who  expect to become unemployed within
12 months anticipate  a substantial 10s~.  This is likely to be due to low re-employment
probabilities in the Dutch labour market, since the direct loss in income  is relatively smal1 in the
Netherlands. Using a simple search model, we wil1  show that the estimates are plausible. Suppose
an individual is employed, earns wage w and anticipates becoming unemployed at rate 6. When
unemployed, this individual wil1  receive  a benefit  b and wil1  find  again a job at rate  h (w > b). In
the new job, the individual wil1  earn wage w and anticipates becoming unemployed at rate 6. The
individual discounts the future at rate p. Lifetime utility V can then be written  as
((p+h)w+sb)/(p(p+G+h).  This implies a willingness to pay (Wp) for 6 which equals 6(b-
w)l(p+h) and a marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for 6 which equals (b-w)/(p+h+Q.  We
assume now that h is 0.66 and p is 0.10. The expected duration of being unemployed afier  losing
the job is then 1.5 years, which corresponds to the average  Dutch unemployment duration during
the period 1983-1987 (Gorter et al., 1990). The determinant ‘the expectation of becoming
unemployed within a year’ seems to indicate  a large yearly separation rate.  We assume that 6 is
three (the probability of becoming unemployed within a year is then 0.90). In 1985, the Dutch
unemployment insurance payment initially amounted to 80% of the most recently eamed wage,
9 The estimates of the MWP for job attributes based on the ‘structural  form’ model are larger in absolute value, but
less statistically signifkantly  different from zero.
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however,  this was reduced after  a maximum of six months. Thus, the loss in eamings is more
than 20%. For simplicity, we assume that (b-w)/w is -30%. Given these assumptions, the WP for
the absente  of 6 is 118%. Such a number is quite  close to the 147% implied by the results
reported by Van Ophem (1991). Clearly, higher  re-employment rates h imply a lower WP for the
absente  of 6, since the expected duration of being unemployed is shorter. In the case that h is
one, the WP for the absente  of 6 is 59%. Furthermore, the marginal  willingness to pay for the
absente  of 6 is decreasing in h and in 6. In the case that h is 0.66 and p is 0.10, the percent MWP
for the absente  of the yearly separation rate 6 decreases from 39% (6 = 0) to 2.5% (6 = 10).
Finally, and in line with the estimates implied by the results of Parsons  (1991),  Van Ophem
reports that ‘good promotion prospects’ are valued at about the current wage rate (MWP is 97%
of the wage). As argued before, this result  is plausible. The two studies discussed  above employ
different data sets, estimation methods and empirical specifïcations. However,  they both include
job tenure  as a determinant of job search. Hence, this gives US the opportunity to compare
estimates. Job tenure  may be regarded as a benefïcial job ‘attribute’, since tenure  generally is
associated  with more job security, higher  levels of pension, so it has a negative effect on job
search.
For example, Kahn and Low (1984) used the 1969-1971 National Longitudinal Surveys
data on young men to study the employed workers’ choice among employed search, unemployed
search, and not searching for a new job. A trichotomous logit model is employed. The wage rates
are specified  in logarithms. The results show that current wages and job tenure  are each
negatively associated with search intensity (see Table 3).
****************
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Insert Table 3
****************
We found that the study by Parsons  (1991) implies a percent MWP for job tenure  of 25%
(young men), and 1 lo/ (o young women);  the study by Kahn and Low (1984) implies 29% (young
men), and the study by Van Ophem (1991) implies 14%. It is worth noting that Parsons’ (1991)
and Kahn and Low’s (1984) estimates of the young men’s MWP for job tenure  by are ahnost
identical, whereas the young women’s MWP for job tenure  is lower. The study by Van Ophem
(1991),  which does not distinguish between men and women,  indicates  a somewhat lower MWP.
Given the noted differences between the studies, the results seem to cover a relatively smal1
range. We conclude therefore that the estimation method used here generally robust results
among different studies.
7.2. Unemployed job search
Barron and Mellow  (1979). Barron and Mellow (1979) used a special survey among a
sample of the unemployed respondents in the May 1976 U.S. Current Population Survey, to  study
the unemployed individual’s choice of how much  time  to devote to searching for a job. Particular
attention was paid to the role of unemployment insurance benefïts  and to individuals who have
recently been (temporarily) laid off. Regression models  are employed for the full sample and for
a sample restricted to individuals entering unemployment fï-om  prior jobs. The weekly insurance
benefits  are assumed to affect search time  linearly. Dummies are used for ‘expected recall. ivithin
30 days’ and ‘expected recall, no period specifïed’. The results show that the unemplo~ment
insurance benefíts and recall expectations reduce unemployment search time.  In Tablc  3, the
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results are given for the sample restricted to individuals entering unemployment fiom  prior
jobs.”
The MWP for expected recall within 30 days is 3 13 dollars, which is about four times  the
average  weekly benefít (for the 31% receiving benefïts, the mean is 77 dollars). Therefore
unemployed individuals are willing to forgo benefit  for a month to receive a recall within a
month. The MWP for expected recall when the period is not known is 144 dollars, almost  twice
the average  weekly benefït.
*****************
Insert Table 4
****************
Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993).  Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993) used a random
sample drawn from the 1982-1984 administrative records of the Dutch unemployment benefit
administration for the Leiden district to study the determinants of search effort. One of the
determinants is the residual  entitlement period of receiving unemployment benefït. Under the
Dutch Unemployment Act, the benefít leve1 considered is approximately 80% of gross eamings
before unemployment. The length in days of unemployment benefït entitlement depends on the
number of days worked. The maximum benefit  duration  is 26 weeks. At the end of the
unemployment entitlement period, the benefït drops to  93?,0  of the benefït leve1 (75% of previous
eamings). Depending on the length of the prior job, thc uncmployed wil1  receive this benefit  for a
certain period. Ultimately, the unemployed receive ~~clfarc.  which is generally substantially less
than the benefit  and which does not depend on previous income.  Search effort is measured by the
number of search contacts. The analysis is based on a Poisson model. The results show that
”  The results for the full sample imply somewhat higher  - but less significant - MWP estimates.
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search effort declines signifïcantly with increasing benefït levels, and rises  over the residual
entitlement period (see Table 5)
****************
Insert Table 5
****************
These results imply that the MWP as a percentage of the benefït for residual  entitlement
(in weeks) is equal to 13.33% -0.26% times  the residual  entitlement period. Hence, the MWP for
residual  entitlement is positive over the entitlement period (maximally 26 weeks) and increases at
a weekly rate  of 0.26% of the benefit  as the end of the entitlement period comes near. The
willingness to pay for one week extra residual  entitlement, at the beginning of entitlement, is 6%
of the benefit  level. The willingness to pay for one week extra residual  entitlement, at the end of
the entitlement period, is 13% of the benefit  level. The empirical outcomes seem quite  plausible,
since, as explained above, at the end of the entitlement period considered, unemployed
individuals lose at least six percent of the benefit  for a certain period and, after  this period the
benefït wil1  be reduced to welfare level.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the marginal willingness to pay for job attributes can be
derived from data on on-the-job search activity. The empirical relevante  of the search approach
to estimate the workers’ marginal willingness to pay is demonstrated based on a number of
2 1
studies in the U.S. and the Netherlands. We-  have provided evidente,  that workers attach
substantial value to non-wage differences between jobs like commuting time,  unpaid overtime,
risk of becoming unemployed and promotion prospects. Furthermore, we demonstrate that data
on unemployed individuals’ search behaviour may be useful in obtaining information on the
value of unemployment attributes such as recall opportunities and the residual  entitlement period
of receiving unemployment benefit.
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Table 1. Coeffïcients  of search activity (encompasses search plans) with respect to attributes, out-of-school,
aged between 17 and 23, U.S., 1980-1981 (based on Parsons,  1991) and the marginal willingness to pay for job
attributes.
men
variables
log wage rate
job tenure  (years)
part-time
promot ion prospects:
very  g o o d
g o o d
not  good
absent
women
coeffkient %  M W P coefficient % MWP
-0.573
(0.129)a
-0.140 24.5
(0.050)” ( 10.4)b
0.373 -65.2
(0.173)b (33.6)’
-1.008 175.9
(0. 174)a (49.9y
-0.640 111.6
(0.180)’ (40.2)”
-0.479 83.6
(0.183)’ (37.1)b
-0.484
(0. 165)a
-0.062
(0.106)
0.202
(0.108)’
-1.289
(0.163)a
-0.827
(0.141)’
-0.240
(0.149)
10.9
(10.6)
-35.3
(20.5)’
225.0
(58.1)a
144.3
(40.8)a
41.9
(27.7)
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. a: signifïcantly different from zero at the 0.01 level.  h  ugnlficantly
different from zero at the 0.05 level; c: signifïcantly different fiom zero at the 0.10 level.
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Table 2. Coeffcients of search with respect to job attributes, The Netherlands, 1985 (based on Van Ophem,
1991) and the present marginal willingness to pay for job attributes.
variables coefficient %MWP
log wage rate
commuting time  (minutes, one way)
job tenure  (years)
unpaid overtime (hours per week)
unemployment expectation
good promotion prospects
-0.442
(0.165)
0.006
(0.002)
-0.060
(0.068)
0.021
(0.013)
0.650
(0.106)
-0.428
(0.087)
-1.40
(0.72)b
13.6
(15.4)
-4.75
(2.83)’
.147.06
(46.24)a
96.83
( 16.93)a
Notes: standard errors  in parentheses. a: signifïcantly different from zero at the 0.01 level; b: significantly
different Erom  zero at the 0.05 level; c: significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level.
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Table 3. Coeffcients of search with respect to job attributes, men, aged between 17 and 23, U.S., 1969-1971
(based on Kahn and Low, 1984) and the present marginal willingness to pay for job attributes.
variables coefficient %MWP
log wage rate
job tenure  (years)
-0.706
(0.180)
-0.204
(0.037)
28.95
(9.06)a
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. a: significantly different IÌom  zero at the 0.01 level.
28
Table 4. Coeffcients of search time (search hours per week) with respect to attributes of unemployed
individuals entering unemployment from prior jobs in 1976, U.S. (based on Barron and Mellow, 1979) and the
marginal willingness to pay for unemployment attributes.
variables coefficient MWPIAWB M W P
weekly  insurance benefit
expected recall,
within 30 days
expected recall,
no period specified
-0.019
(0.006)a
-5.950 4.065 313.15:
(1.390)a (1 .674)b (129.11’
-2.740 1.873 144.21
(0.739y (0.81 I)b (62.44:
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. a: signifïcantly different fiom zero at the 0.01 level; b: signifícantly
different from zero at the 0.05 level. AWB: average  weekly benefit.
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Table 5. Coefficients of search contacts  of unemployed individuals receiving unemployment benefit in 1982-
1984, Leiden, The Netherlands (based on Lindeboom and Theeuwes, 1993) and the marginal willingness to
pay for unemployment attributes as a percentage of the benefit.
variables coefficient % M W P
log benefit -0.27
(0.031)’
residual entitlement period -0.036 13.33
(0.005)” (2.40)a
(residual entitlement period)2 0.0007 -0.26*residual  entitlement period
(0.0002)’ (0.08)”
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. a: insignificantly different from zero at the 0.01 level. Residual entitlement
period measured in weeks.
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